The shot-noise unit (SNU) is a crucial factor for the practical security of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. In the most widely used experimental scheme, the SNU should be calibrated first and acts as a constant during key distribution. However, the practical SNU could be controlled by the eavesdropper, which will differ from the calibrated one. It could open loopholes for the eavesdropper to intercept the secret key. In this paper, we report a quantum hacking method to control the practical SNU by using the limited compensation rate in the polarization compensation phase. Since the compensation is only based on of the polarization measurement results of part of local oscillator pulses, the other unmeasured pulses will leave a loophole for eavesdroppers to control the practical SUN. The simulation and experiment results indicate that the practical SNU can be controlled by the eavesdropper. Thus, the eavesdropper can use the fact that, the practical SNU is no longer equals to the calibrated one to control the excess noise and final key rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) ensures that two legal parties(Alice and Bob) generate secure keys through an untrusted channel [1, 2] . The physical implementation of CV-QKD using Gaussian modulated coherent state is based on optical communication techniques which are beneficial to a wide range of practical applications [3] [4] [5] . With the development of CV-QKD experiment [6, 7] , the transmittance distance of CV-QKD system in the filed test has reached 50km, which is enough to support the construction of metropolitan networks [8] . Meanwhile, CV-QKD protocols based on Gaussian modulated coherent state have been proved to be theoretical secure against general attacks both in the the asymptotic case [9] [10] [11] and the finite-size regime [12, 13] .
Although the theoretical security of CV-QKD protocols has been proved, many assumptions are made in the process of security analysis. For example, the shotnoise unit (SNU) should be constant as a normalization parameter of quadrature measurement results [1] . The calibrated SNU is measured by Bob via the interference between the local oscillator (LO) and the vacuum mode before the key distribution. Because the quadrature measurement results of Bob is normalized by the calibrated SNU but scaled with the practical SNU, the consistency of the calibrated and the practical SNU is crucial for the security of a CV-QKD system. The LO is a necessary auxiliary light beam for homodyne detection and the calibration of the SNU, which is not included in the security analysis of the EB scheme of CV-QKD [17] . As a result, Eve can bias the practical SNU by manipulating the LO in the channel when CV-QKD system is running. [14, 15] . In the existing quantum hacking scheme, the eavesdropper changes the practical SNU of the receiving end by controlling the delay between the LO and the sampling clock [14] or the intensity of LO [15] , so as to reduce the estimation result of excess noise.
In this paper, we propose a polarization attack method against the CV-QKD system by manipulating the polarization of LO pulses during key distributing. Because the polarization drift rate is slower than the repetition frequency of the CV-QKD system, the polarization compensation is implemented by measuring a part of LO pulses, defined as reference LO pulses here. Although the physical implementation is simplified in this way, we call unmeasured LO pulses for those whose polarization are not measured and they can be easily manipulated by the eavesdropper to control the practical SNU. The eavesdropper can make the calibrated and practical SNU unequal by applying the polarization attack to hide the introduced excess noise.
The paper is organized as followed: In section II, we explain the polarization attack method in detail. The eavesdropper can arbitrarily change the practical SNU by applying specific polarization modulation on the unmeasured LO pulses. In section III, the transmittance and excess noise under this attack are given. Alice and Bob will incorrectly estimate the excess noise and a security loophole reveals when the practical SNU is not equivalent to the calibrated value. In section IV, Numerical simulation results demonstrate that the secret key rate will be overestimated by Alice and Bob when the practical SNU is controlled by Eve. The conclusion and the countermeasure against the polarization attack is discussed in section V.
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II. CONTROL THE PRACTICAL SHOT-NOISE UNIT BY THE POLARIZATION ATTACK

A: Polarization compensation technology
In current physical implementation of CV-QKD protocols [6] [7] [8] 16] , the LO is transmitted together with the signal in one fiber simultaneously to reduce the phase noise generated during the transmission. Time and polarization multiplexing are used in Alice to reduce the crosstalk from the LO (Fig. 1) , while time and polarization demultiplexing are applied by Bob before his homodyne detection. The polarization drift rate of optical pulses in the channel can increase the loss of the signal and the crosstalk from the LO. So polarization compensation is necessary to promote the performance of the system. The current compensation scheme is based on polarization measurement and real-time feedback. Because the LO and the delayed signal pulses are multiplexed with orthogonal polarization in the channel and the signal pulses are too weak to be measured directly, the feedback depends on the polarization measurement result of the LO.
The polarization of optical pulses in a fiber can be described by the orientation angle θ and elliptic angle ϕ shown in Fig. 2 , where θ and ϕ are used to characterize the orientation and degree of linear polarization respectively. Since the polarization extinction ratio of the laser source in the CV-QKD system is always higher than 30dB, it is reasonable to assume all optical pulses as linearly polarized. Thus, the elliptic angle of a linearly polarized optical pulse is 0 • , and only the effect of the orientation angle is considered in this paper.
Compared to the high repetition frequency of the system, the polarization drifts slowly enough and can be compensated by only measuring reference LO pulses. For example, the polarization drift rate in the aerial fiber with gale is 34rad/s, which is several orders of magnitude faster than in the underground fiber [18] . If the polarization drift threshold is set as 10 −5 rad which introduces negligible noise in system, the necessary compensation rate is just 3.4MHz. For the CV-QKD system transmitted in the underground fiber, a polarization compensation with kHz rate is efficient enough without any technical barriers. Moreover, the repetition frequency of the current mature CV-QKD system is 5MHz and is still increasingly [8] . Thus it's efficient for Bob only to choose a part of the LO pulses in a cycle of the compensation to estimate the drift of the all pulses.
The cycle of compensation is set as N pulses and we consider the polarization difference of those N pulses is within the threshold. Thus, Bob chooses M (M ≤ N ) LO pulses to measure their polarization, which is the reference of the feedback. Polarization beam splitters (PBS) split the incident beam into two beams of orthogonal linear polarization. The LO and signal light pulses are splitted into their respective optical path after polarization demultiplexing. If the polarization of the N − M unmeasured LO pulses is not the same as those of the M reference LO pulses, the polarization of this N − M LO pulses cannot be compensated correctly. As shown in Fig. 1 (b) , the orientation of M reference LO pulses is parallel to the slow axis of the PBS but there is a misalignment angle θ between the N − M unmeasured LO pulses and the slow axis. Then the signal pulses will still be splitted into signal path but the LO will also partially leak into the signal path as shown in Fig. 1 . This will give Eve an opportunity to control the intensity of the LO in the channel.
B: Description of the polarization attack
Ideally, the slow axis of the PBS is parallel to the orientation angle of all LO pulses and is orthogonal to the orientation angle of all signal pulses after the polarization compensation. We assume that Eve introduces a misalignment angle between the slow axis of the PBS and the orientation angle of the N − M LO pulses. These LO pulses can be decomposed into the parallel part and the orthogonal part. According to the Marius's law, the intensity of the orthogonal part which is splitted into the signal path is given by
where I LO is the intensity of the LO into the PBS and α is the loss of the PBS. The intensity of the parallel part which is splitted into the LO path is
According to the above analysis, Eve can control the intensity of the LO for homodyne detection by modulating the orientation angle of the unmeasured LO pulses. The SNU is proportional to the intensity of the LO,
where N 0 is the calibrated SNU, k is the a proportional constant depends by the homodyne detector and ∆X vac is the vacuum fluctuation. As a result, the practical SNU corresponding to the attacked LO pulses is controlled by Eve to
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Since there is a delay between the LO pulses and the signal pulses, the LO leaking into the signal path can not affect the signal. The homodyne detection result is normalized by the calibrated SNU, but the value is controlled by Eve under the polarization attack. Fig. 3 shows the experimental shot noise variance with different orientation angle modulation on the LO. According to Eq. 3, we plot a theoretical curve which matches well with the experimental result. The shot noise variance of 0 • corresponds to the case without the polarization attack. By modulating different orientation angle, the practical shot noise variance is reduced to arbitrary value. Therefore, the difference between the calibrated SNU and the practical one is mastered by Eve, which will cause inaccuracy in parameter estimation by Alice and Bob.
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION UNDER THE POLARIZATION ATTACK
The target of the quantum hacking is to control the results of parameter estimation without being noticed, especially the excess noise. In this section, we demonstrate that Alice and Bob will overestimate the secret key rate through the process of parameter estimation under the attack. The security analysis is derived under collective attack implemented by Eve, the excess noise is introduced by Eve to get more information of the secret key. If the introduced excess noise is not hidden, the information of secret key available for Eve can be estimated and excluded by the privacy amplification [19] .
In the system with polarization compensation, the introduced excess noise can be concealed in the parameter estimation by manipulating the orientation angle of the unmeasured LO pulses.
Alice selects two sets of random variables X and P from Gaussian distribution random numbers whose variance is V A and mean value is 0 to prepare Gaussian modulated coherent states. The coherent states and the LO pulses are transmitted to Bob in the same fiber after time-division multiplexing and polarization multiplexing. In the channel, Eve performs collective attack on the coherent states to acquire information of secret keys. At the receiving end, Bob performs homodyne (X or P) or heterodyne (X and P) detection after demultiplexing. Since X and P quadratures are symmetrical, we give analysis based on the X quadrature of the homodyne detection for simplicity. The efficiency and electronic noise of the practical homodyne detector are also not considered in this paper. These imperfections could increase the complexity of the calculation, but have little effect on the performance of the attack. Then, the homodyne detection result X B without attack is [20] 
where T is the practical channel transmittance, N 0 is the calibrated SNU and Z is the total noise. The numerator indicates the homodyne detection result and the denominator shows the calibrated SNU in Eq. 5. The secret key rate under collective attack is derived from the covariance matrix [1] 
where ε is the practical excess noise, I = 1 0 0 1 and
The transmittance of the channel T and the excess noise ε are derived with the data of Alice and the homodyne detection result of Bob,
If Eve applies an orientation angle modulation on the unmeasured LO pulses, the homodyne detection result of the corresponding pulses reads
Similarly, the numerator and the denominator are also the homodyne detection result and the calibrated SNU respectively in Eq. 8. Since the practical SNU is not the same as the calibrated one, the normalized quadrature is controlled by Eve. Accordingly, the transmittance and the excess noise under attack are
where k is the ratio between the reference LO pulses and the cycle of the compensation or called polarization measurement ratio (PMR). The estimated excess noise is dependent both on the PMR k and the orientation angle
The PMR is a constant for the specific system, Eve could reduce the estimated excess noise to arbitrary value by modulating the corresponding orientation angle on the unmeasured LO pulses. Thus, she will hide the introduced excess noise as well as obtain the largest amount of secret key information. After the attack, the covariance matrix becomes
By comparing the above two covariance matrices Eq. 6 and Eq. 10, the different elements are the transmittance of the channel and the excess noise which are the decisive parameters for the secret key rate of CV-QKD. Thus, the difference between the practical secret key rate K (T, ǫ) and the estimated K (T ′ , ǫ ′ ) under the attack is the amount of the key information which is acquired for Eve. The detailed calculation of K ( , ) is shown in the appendix.
IV. PRACTICAL SECURITY ANALYSIS UNDER THE POLARIZATION ATTACK
According to the above analysis, Eve's collective attack will introduce excess noise into the Bob's measurement result [21] . If Eve doesn't apply the polarization attack, the transmittance and excess noise estimated by Alice and Bob are the practical value T and ǫ. When the polarization attack is implemented to conceal the excess noise, the estimated channel parameters become T ′ and ǫ ′ . Since ǫ ′ is a function of the practical transmittance and the modulated orientation angle as Eq. 9, Eve needs 
FIG. 5.
The ideal secret key rate whose the channel parameters are experiment results (dashed line), the maximal secret key rate available for Eve (dotted line) and the ratio of them (solid line, left y axis) vs. transmittance distance. Here Alice's modulation variance VA = 19 and reconciliation efficiency β = 95% [22] .
to adjust the orientation angle of the attack to keep the excess noise within a secure value at different transmittance distances. The tolerable excess noise is the minimal value that all secret key is acquired by Eve. Therefore Eve can acquire all key information by introducing the tolerable noise and reduce the estimated excess noise to a normal value(0.005) [6] by the polarization attack. Fig. 4 shows the minimal introduced excess noise for Eve to acquire all secret key information. By applying the polarization attack, the estimated excess noise can be suppressed to a normal value 0.005.
The secret key rate is completely determined by the channel parameters. The secret key rate under the polarization attack or not can be expressed by K (T, ǫ) and K (T ′ , ǫ ′ ). We assume that ǫ introduced by Eve is set as the tolerable excess noise. Therefore, the secret key rate K (T, ǫ) without the polarization attack remains 0 at all distance and all secret key established by Alice and Bob is insecure. Although the estimated key rate K (T ′ , ǫ ′ ) seems secure when Eve applies the attack, these secret key information is all available for Eve. Fig. 6 shows that the attack will slightly reduce the estimated transmittance, so the available key rate K (T ′ , ǫ ′ ) for Eve will be slightly reduced. The ideal secret key rate K (T, 0.005) whose the channel parameters are experiment results [6] is also illustrated in Fig. 5 . The ratio of K (T ′ , ǫ ′ ) to K (T, 0.005) indicates that the secret key rate available for Eve is gradually approaching to the ideal secret key rate as the distance increases. Because the excess noise which needed to be concealed is considerably small with high channel loss, the decline of the estimated transmittance caused by the attack is also less significant. Therefor, the polarization attack is more effective and imperceptible with low channel transmission or at long distance (≥ 10km).
The orientation angle which should be modulated by Eve at different distance is shown in Fig. 6 with different PMR k. Because the transmittance T and the minimal introduced excess noise ǫ both decrease with the increasing of distance, the orientation angle modulated by Eve is also reduced which matches the Eq. 9. Only the unmeasured LO pulses can be manipulated by Eve, the lower PMR suggests that the bigger orientation angle is needed to reduce the estimated excess noise. If the PMR is promoted to 100%, the polarization attack will not be effective to the system.
In the practical environment, the estimated channel transmittance which depends on several factors, for example the phase noise may not be equivalent to the practical fiber loss. The transmittance is also affected by the attack. A slight fluctuation of the transmittance is reasonable in CV-QKD, but too much deviation may still be noticed by Alice and Bob. We show the ratio of transmittance between two cases in Fig. 7 . The estimated transmittance is reduced to nearly 85% of the practical value when the distance is less than 10km. As the distance increases over 30km, the estimated transmittance keeps getting closer to the practical value and they nearly equals. It means that Alice and Bob can not observe the attack by the abnormal transmittance over a certain distance.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose a polarization attack against the practical security of CV-QKD systems to conceal the introduced excess noise. Because the polarization drift rate is lower than the repetition frequency of the system, the polarization measurement for compensation can be only applied on part of LO pulses to simplify the physical implementation. This scheme opens a practical loophole for Eve to control the homodyne result by modulating the orientation angle of the unmeasured LO pulses. The SNU is positively correlated with the intensity of the LO which can be reduced by the modulation on the orientation angle of the LO pulses in the channel. As a result, the practical SNU can be controlled by Eve when the system is running. The effect of the polarization modulation on LO is also demonstrated by the experiment and the polarization attack can lower the practical SNU than the calibrated one, which has been proven to be effective to CV-QKD protocols.
The parameter estimation under the polarization attack shows that the estimated excess noise is totally controlled by Eve with a slight decrease of the estimated transmittance. At different distances, the excess noise which is introduced by Eve is manipulated at a secure value. Alice and Bob can not observe that the key distribution is no longer secure. Since the attack is based on the limited polarization measurement rate, the most simple countermeasure is to raise the PMR to 100%, which will increase the complexity of the practical system. Because the core of the polarization attack is to utilize the difference between the calibrated SNU and the practical one, another countermeasure is the real-time shot noise measurement [23] which is effective for all attacks against the shot noise. To completely close the detection loopholes, the most se-cure way is the currently proposed continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocols [27] [28] [29] , which can remove all known and unknown attacks on the detection. In the recently proposed CV implementations whose LO is generated "locally" [30, 31] , the polarization attack can not be directly implemented to control the practical SNU. But the polarization of the reference pulses could still be controlled by Eve to affect the measurement results, the specific attack against the "local" LO schemes could be analyzed in further research. The secret key rate of CV-QKD protocols is calculated with the covariance matrix. We suppose the final quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is ρ AB with a covariance matrix
we only show the secret key rate for reverse reconciliation [19] K = βI (A : B) − S (E : B) ,
where I (A : B) is the classical mutual entropy between Alice and Bob, S(E : B) = S (E) − S (E |x B ) is the quantum mutual entropy between Eve and Bob [24] , and β is the reconciliation efficiency. The mutual information between Alice and Bob reads
where χ = 1−T T + ǫ. Since Eve's system E can purify AB, we have S (E) = S (AB). S (AB) is calculated with the two symplectic eigenvalues (λ 1 , λ 2 ) of the covariance matrix γ AB [25] S (AB) = G [(λ 1 − 1)/2] + G [(λ 2 − 1)/2] ,
where G (x) = (x + 1) log 2 (x + 1) − xlog 2 x is the Von Neumann entropy [26] . Then the system AE is also a pure state after Bob's measurement, S (E |x B ) = S (A |x B ). S (A |x B ) is a function of the symplectic eigenvalue (λ 3 ) of the covariance matrix γ xB
the covariance matrix γ xB A [17] is
where X = diag(1, 0) and MP denotes the Moore-Penrose inverse of the matrix.
